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The fifty-day war on the Gaza Strip during the summer of 2014 was far more
devastating than previous conflicts. But it was neither unprecedented nor
unpredictable, being, in effect, Israel’s twelfth war against Gaza. This essay
contends that if the seemingly endless cycle of violence is to be broken, the
latest conflict must be placed in its proper context: the eleven wars on Gaza that
preceded this one and Israel’s obdurate refusal to countenance the national
rights of the Palestinians or recognize Gaza as an integral part of Palestine.
GAZA HAS LONG BEEN one of historic Palestine’s main cities, its gateway to the Sinai Desert, and a
thriving oasis in Wadi Ghazza (the sharply defined streambed whose flow was higher than the
Jordan River during the rainy season). Under the British Mandate, from 1922 to 1948, Gaza was one
of the six districts of Palestine. When the United Nations (UN) voted in 1947 to partition the country
between Jews and Arabs, Gaza was supposed to be one of the main ports of the future Arab state.
After the partition plan was approved by the Zionist leadership and rejected by the Arab side, the
ensuing war between Jews and Arabs in Palestine had little impact on Gaza since only 2 percent of
the district’s population was Jewish. But the situation changed dramatically with the proclamation of
the State of Israel in May 1948. The Egyptian army entered the territory, and Gaza soon became a
safe haven for waves of refugees fleeing from other parts of Palestine. Although Israel then
bombed Gaza from the air, the ground, and the sea, the Egyptian army stood fast until the cease-
fire concluded under UN auspices went into effect in January 1949.
Crucible of Palestinian Nationalism
This first war created the 140-square-mile swath of land we know today as the “Gaza Strip,” and
saw the influx of over two hundred thousand Palestinian refugees whose arrival increased the local
population of eighty thousand by a factor of 2.5 (approximately the same proportions obtain to this
day with 1.2 million of the territory’s 1.8 million inhabitants consisting of refugees). The Gaza Strip
remained under Egyptian military control but as Egypt refused to annex it, the territory became the
only part of historic Palestine that was neither absorbed by the new state of Israel nor annexed by
Transjordan (which became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as a result). And therein lies the
explanation for Gaza’s transformation into a magnet for Palestinian nationalism.
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It was indeed in the very city of Gaza that the short-lived All-Palestine Government (hukumat
‘umum filistin) operated in September–October 1948. It was in Gaza that the first Palestinian
National Council was then convened and that the declaration of independence of Palestine was
proclaimed.1 It was in Gaza that the Palestinian right of self-determination found unprecedented
collective expression.
David Ben-Gurion understood the long-term menace for the Zionist project of such a
concentration of Palestinian refugees. That is why his plenipotentiary at the UN-sponsored
Lausanne peace conference in May 1949 made a formal proposal for the annexation of the Gaza
Strip. Even though this was based on an incorrect estimate of one hundred thousand refugees
rather than the two hundred thousand actually present in the Gaza Strip, Israel presented its
“offer” as its final contribution to the settlement of the refugee problem.2 The “offer” was flatly
rejected by the Arab states and the Lausanne conference broke up without achieving any result.
The second war was part of what Israeli historian Benny Morris has described as “Israel’s border
wars,”3 a seven-year period of hostility on Israel’s borders with Syria, Lebanon, and the Jordanian-
annexed West Bank, as well as the Gaza Strip. In this war of attrition, ostensibly waged to deter
Palestinian “infiltrators,” mostly peasants who wanted to visit their lost homes and tend their
lands, Israeli brutality in Gaza was far more systematic than in the West Bank, Syria, or Lebanon.
In October 1951, when Egypt claimed it was unable to seal off the Gaza Strip from the Sinai
Peninsula, Israel’s response was that the bulk of Palestinian refugees should be transferred to the
other side of Egypt and be placed in the desert on the Libyan frontier.4
Israel intensified its attacks on Gaza with the formation in 1953 of the secret Unit 101, a group of
special forces headed by the ambitious major, Ariel Sharon. Tasked with striking preemptively deep
inside the Palestinian territories, Sharon first led his commandos in a raid against the refugee camp
of al-Bureij, south of Gaza City, killing at least twenty civilians. The most murderous raid occurred in
February 1955, when thirty-six Egyptian soldiers, two Palestinian civilians, and eight Israeli troops
lost their lives in the Israeli attack on an Egyptian barracks north of Gaza City.
Instead of “terrorizing the terrorists,” however, the Israeli initiative backfired. In August 1955,
Egypt’s intelligence service launched a counteroffensive by proxy, overseeing the infiltration into
Gaza of trained and armed Palestinian militants called fedayeen. Israel retaliated by killing seventy-
two Egyptians and Palestinians in Gaza, after which an uneasy truce prevailed. But, following
Israel’s heavy artillery bombing of Gaza City in April 1956, Egypt unleashed a second fedayeen wave.
Such challenges convinced Israel that Nasser’s Egypt had to be confronted and Gaza’s “fedayeen
nest” liquidated. Thus, Israel’s third war on Gaza began as part of the overall Israeli campaign
against Egypt, planned in an active alliance with France and Great Britain. During Israel’s
occupation of the Gaza Strip from November 1956 to March 1957 to “hunt” for “terrorists,” there
were at least two instances of mass killings, first in Khan Yunis, then in Rafah refugee camps—both
well documented by Joe Sacco in his graphic masterpiece, “Footnotes in Gaza.”5
The conservative estimate stands at around one thousand killed during the four months of
the Israeli occupation, out of a total population of some three hundred thousand.6 Palestinian
sources claim 1,231 persons were killed and 239 went missing.7 If one adds to the number of
fatalities all those injured, detained, or tortured, at least one percent of the Gazan population
suffered firsthand from unbridled Israeli violence. Until the 2014 assault, so-called Operation
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Protective Edge, this third Israeli war on Gaza was proportionately the bloodiest for the
Palestinian population.
A ten-year truce then followed. From 1957 to 1967, Israel relied on Nasser to rein in Palestinian
militants in the Gaza Strip. In Israel, there is an obvious nostalgia today for this iron fist–imposed
quiet along the southern border, although Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (the current president of Egypt) is
no Gamal Abdel Nasser. Still, in an effort to defuse the mounting Palestinian pressure from Gaza,
Nasser presided over the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, all the
while ensuring that its military arm, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), remained dependent
on the Sinai-based Egyptian command and deprived of any heavy weaponry.8
Less than three years later, in June 1967, Israel went on the offensive again, this time against
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This fourth war lasted only two days before Egypt’s unconditional
surrender in Gaza. The forty-eight-hour battle had been extremely violent, however, causing
extensive “collateral damage,” including the death of fourteen Indian UN peacekeepers who were
killed in Israel’s aerial bombing of their Gaza hotel and the partial destruction or looting of ninety
out of a total one hundred UN-run schools.9 And deadly mopping-up operations went on for
days in Khan Yunis, long after the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire came into effect.10 So vivid did the
trauma remain from Israel’s 1956–57 occupation, that at least one-tenth of Gaza’s Palestinian
population fled.11 According to the Israeli author, Tom Segev, the Israeli leadership, long obsessed
with the Palestinian birth rate, actively fostered collective flight from the territory.12
Still, the “demographic war”was only a sideshow for Israel’s fifth war, against what had become an
indigenous low-intensity insurgency. For four years after the June 1967 war, the Palestinian resistance
movement displayed extraordinary resilience, which stemmed from the unique blend of “classical”
military training of former PLA noncommissioned officers and the revolutionary “popular
struggle” approach of fedayeen organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) and Fatah. In July of 1971, Ariel Sharon, now chief of the Southern Command,
ordered and led the Israeli army’s bulldozing of significant portions of refugee housing in Gaza,
burying alive an unknown number of Palestinian guerrillas in underground tunnels.
The sixth war was a covert one, with Israeli intelligence supporting Islamist militants against
nationalist activists, in a perverse version of “divide and rule” tactics. In March 1973, the “Guevara of
Gaza,” as the local PFLP leader Muhammad al-Aswad was nicknamed, fell in an Israeli ambush. Six
months later, the Israeli military governor attended in person the opening of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin’s
new mosque in the Jawrat al-Shams neighborhood of Gaza. Yasin had organized the Gaza branch of
the Muslim Brotherhood as a mujamma‘ Islami (Islamic congregation), whose activities were
tolerated years before their official approval by the Israeli authorities in 1979. Yasin was both aware
and wary of the Israeli game, but he had shunned the call to join the anti-Israeli resistance as early as
1967, and was pushing a “re-Islamization” agenda that put him at odds with the nationalist camp.13
The divisive tactics worked well for Israel during the bloody vendetta that pitted Islamists against
nationalist militants in Gaza between 1979 and 1983. But the occupying forces found the blowback
hard to handle when the rift between rival factions led to anti-Israeli escalation under Islamic Jihad’s
growing influence. In December 1987, Yasin dissolved the mujamma‘ and launched the Islamic
resistance movement (harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiyya), known by its Arabic acronym,
Hamas, against the backdrop of the first intifada, which broke out on the ninth of that month.
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Bastion of Resistance
Israel’s seventh war against Gaza was part of the brutal suppression of the unarmed civilian
uprising. Between 1987 and1993, more than five hundred people were killed in the Gaza Strip and
about the same number of homes were destroyed. Furthermore, in January 1991, Israel revoked
the “general exit order” that it had issued in 1972 to allow residents of the occupied territories to
move freely between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel during daylight hours only. With this new
measure, Palestinians now had to request individual exit permits every time they wanted to leave
the territory. In March 1993, for the first time, Israel completely sealed off the Gaza Strip from the
rest of the world, going on to make increasing use of such collective punishment measures.
Following the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Oslo accords
in September 1993 between PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
control of most of the Gaza Strip (excluding the settlements and the self-styled Israeli military zones)
passed to the Oslo-created Palestinian Authority (PA). Arafat was able to return to Gaza in July 1994
and spent most of his time there until he could, more than a year later, transfer the main seat of the
PA to Ramallah.
The original “peace process” lasted in earnest only two years, until Rabin’s assassination in
November 1995 and the seven-month interim government of Shimon Peres that followed. But
even during the heyday of the process, in Gaza, residents were often banned from using the
territory’s main roads—which the Israeli army reserved for the exclusive use of settlers—and
the Strip was sealed off from the rest of the world one day out of three, a total of 342 days in the
1993–96 period. There was no peace dividend for the Palestinians of Gaza: in 1994–95, the total
volume of international transfers did not offset the negative impact of repeated closures.14
A staunch opponent of Oslo, Benjamin Netanyahu sabotaged the accords during his first term as
prime minister (1996–99), and his successor Ehud Barak perpetuated the downward spiral. The
effective collapse of peace negotiations in the summer of 2000 undermined the authority and
prestige of the PA and played into the hands of Hamas, whose more confrontational and radicalized
stance helped set the stage for the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000. Gaza’s airport
had operated for less than two years, basically serving few besides the Palestinian nomenklatura;
major development projects like the Gaza port and business incubators ran aground; and the
industrial zones in the border areas of Erez and Karni were, in effect, integrated into the Israeli market.
From February 2001 until September 2005, when Israel put in place what it described as a
disengagement plan, Ariel Sharon, now prime minister, waged the eighth war on Gaza. Building
on his previous experience during the second and fifth wars (1953–55 and 1970–71, respectively)
Sharon took the cycle of hostilities to new heights of ruthlessness. Initially, Israel’s main target was
the PA, with major operations aimed at destroying the tunnels to Egypt. Then the focus moved to
the Hamas leadership, which was liquidated by means of purported “surgical strikes” that were in
fact carried out at a high cost to civilians.15 Hamas’s leader, Yasin, was killed in March 2004, as
was his successor, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Rantisi, the following month.
During the second intifada, some three thousand Palestinians perished in the Gaza Strip (three
times the number of those killed in the West Bank, which was “re-occupied” by Israel in 2002).16
In January 2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected the new PA president, two months after the death
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of Arafat, and in March, Hamas and the other Palestinian guerrilla groups agreed on an informal
truce with Israel (tahdi’a, literally calming or pacification). Sharon regarded this eighth war as a
victory, and in August and September 2005 proceeded with the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli
troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip. The PA had no say in this dramatic development, while
Hamas was able to claim that it had succeeded in forcing out the Israeli occupier.
The ninth war on Gaza was launched simultaneously with Israel’s so-called disengagement, and
it lasted two years. Sharon fired off the first salvo in October 2005, with an offensive symbolically
named Eternal Renewal. The Erez industrial zone was dismantled and its thousands of Palestinian
employees summarily laid off; Israel arbitrarily reduced the Oslo-assigned Palestinian fishing zone
from twenty to only nine nautical miles; and a concrete wall several meters high was rapidly built
around the “evacuated” territory, with frequent and devastating Israeli incursions across what is
referred to as the fence (especially after the June 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit).
In actual fact, Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip had only changed the form of the
occupation without altering its fundamentally oppressive nature. The Israeli army now implemented
an innovative version of remote-control occupation, saving on the military, human, and financial
costs of direct control, while maintaining authority over who and what could come in or out of Gaza
and when (with the close cooperation of Egypt at the southern crossing point of Rafah).
Legally speaking, Israel remained the occupying power in the Gaza Strip,17 since it held full
control of the territory’s land borders (with the exception of Egyptian-controlled Rafah), air space,
and territorial waters (with fishing limits downgraded to six, and then to three nautical miles). In
September 2007, Israel officially declared the Strip a “hostile entity,” where no Israeli citizen
should be allowed other than in combat. With the appalling record of suffering and destruction
wrought by nine Israeli wars during the previous six decades, such a “hostile” branding appeared
both ludicrous and obscene.
But this Israeli stigmatization of Gaza proved very efficient in obliterating the human dimension of
the territory. Fewer and fewer foreigners, and absolutely no Israelis, were allowed in, which made the
situation in Gaza much harder to report to the outside world, especially in Israel. Sealed off from the
rest of the world, the Gaza Strip became some kind of an abstract territory on which the media focused
only in times of conflict or to warn periodically about an impending humanitarian catastrophe.
During this round of raids and incursions in the “evacuated” Gaza Strip in 2005–7, Israel
killed 668 Palestinians (including 359 civilians). At the same time, 357 Palestinians (half of
them bystanders) were killed in the feud between the PA and Hamas, escalated by Hamas’s
electoral victory of January 2006. By the end of June 2007, Hamas had expelled the PA from
the Gaza Strip and established its undivided rule over the territory. Israel, along with Egypt,
could now justify their blockade of the Gaza Strip on the grounds that it was necessary to
contain and fight “terrorism.”
“Quiet” on the Southern Front: Gaza Uncowed
Operation Cast Lead was Israel’s code name for its tenth war on Gaza in December 2008–January
2009, when 1,417 Palestinians lost their lives, including 236 fighters, and the territory was pummeled
from the air, land, and sea. In June 2010, after nine Turkish NGO activists had been killed in an
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attack by Israeli commandos in international waters as they attempted to break the siege, Israel
decided to alleviate the blockade.
In a self-proclaimed gesture of goodwill, it appeared to reverse its siege policy by publishing a list
of only forty-two commodities whose entry into the Gaza Strip would henceforth be regulated,18
whereas, previously, all commodities had been banned from entering the territory until proven
necessary. In practice, however, because of the end certificate that Israel requires on all
commodities, the ban effectively remains in place. The import of building materials, for example,
remained conditional on the certification of their final use. Only UN agencies or well-established
NGOs have the manpower to handle the massive paperwork this “facility” required. As a result,
imports of consumer goods and commodities rose by twenty-five percent in 2010, while those of
building materials went up by only 10 percent.19
The effective continuation of the blockade on building materials contributed to fortunes being
made by those running the smuggling trade with Egypt. According to the UN, in September 2011
alone, ninety thousand tons of cement were brought into the Gaza Strip via the tunnels—ten
times the authorized amount that came in through the only official crossing point for this trade at
Kerem Shalom.20 Israel’s siege thus became a major incentive to the smuggling business with
Egypt. Hamas adapted its rule to this situation and eventually benefited from it through the
taxation of the tunnels or its monopoly on “strategic” commodities otherwise banned by Israel.
Meanwhile, according to a document leaked toHaaretz in October 2012, Israeli decision-makers
had fixed the average daily intake for the population of Gaza at 2,279 calories per person, and were
allowing supply trucks into the Strip on that basis.21 The fact that Israel could feel empowered to
decide how much a Palestinian could eat on a daily basis shows how perverse and degrading the
post-2005 occupation of the Gaza Strip had become. The description of Gaza as an “open-air
prison”22 was actually far from the mark since, in any jailhouse, detainees are not supposed to be
shot at or bombed except in the case of a full-fledged riot. In Gaza, Israeli raids, whether
“targeted” or not, remained a regular occurrence.
Thus, a year after its tenth offensive against the territory, Israel could believe that it had found
the perfect formula for this upgraded occupation of Gaza: while evidencing utter disregard for
the Palestinian population, Israel lost three soldiers and no civilians in 2011 while seventy-one
Palestinians, including twenty-three civilians, were killed in Gaza-related clashes that year. But
the cycle of violence spiraled out of control once again, and in November 2012, Israel launched the
eleventh war against Gaza, so-called Operation Pillar of Defense. While there was no land offensive
involved in this conflict, 166 Palestinians were killed, an overwhelming majority of them civilians.
One could, however, rightfully consider the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip for the previous seven
years—with Egypt’s significant contribution on the southern border—as an act of war.
The twelfth Israeli war on Gaza started on 8 July 2014. Contrary to previous offensives, this one
was not launched to punish Gaza for its resistance, but because the Netanyahu government was
bent on sabotaging the April 2014 reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas. The
seven-year feud between the PA-run West Bank and Hamas-ruled Gaza was a major strategic
asset the Israeli prime minister sought to protect at all cost: Although Gaza had not been in
its sights to start with, the anti-Hamas campaign Israel unleashed in the West Bank in June
2014 soon led to an escalation.
The Twelve Wars on Gaza
Autumn 2014 || 57
                             
The disaster this twelfth war has caused after fifty days of hostilities is far worse than the previous
“record” from January 2009 when the damage inflicted by the Israeli offensive was estimated at a
minimum of $1.6 billion.23 Operation Protective Edge may have caused damage worth four or
five times that figure24 and has left approximately 108,000 Palestinians homeless as a result of the
total or partial destruction of some 18,000 dwellings. According to UN estimates, only 10 percent
of the population was receiving water once a day for six to eight hours, with 75 percent getting
water once every four days, or worse.25
There were two phases in this twelfth war: most of the casualties fell during the first twenty-nine
days as Israel launched a ground offensive, bombing and reoccupying part of the Gaza Strip, and
driving one out of three inhabitants from their homes; the second phase, from 5 to 26 August,
consisted of a succession of fragile truces, brokered under Egyptian auspices, and punctuated by
renewed outbreaks of hostilities. Egyptian mediation efforts had to be beefed up by US and
European contributions to reach a lasting cease-fire on 26 August.26 Under the terms of the cease-
fire, Israel agreed to alleviate the pressure on the crossing-points into the Gaza Strip at Erez and
Karni, to restore the six-nautical-mile fishing zone, and to scale back to one hundred meters the
three-hundred-meter no-go zone inside the Gaza Strip from its border. Hamas, for its part,
committed to handing the crossing points to Israel and Egypt back to the PA. Palestinian
demands for an operational port with a connection to Cyprus, for the reconstruction of the Gaza
airport, and for the release of more prisoners were left to future discussions.
Throughout the fifty days of conflict, Israel was unable to stop Hamas rocket-fire into its
territory, further demonstrating that the 2005 “unilateral withdrawal” could not provide a lasting
solution to Israel’s security requirement on its southern flank. Israel badly needs a powerful
partner in Gaza and given the demise of the Egyptian option over half a century ago, the partner
clearly has to be Palestinian. And if Israel will not consider official dealings with Hamas, then it
has to accept the Palestinian reconciliation and allow the PA back into Gaza.
At the same time, the Palestinian population of Gaza has the absolute right to live in peace
without paying the price of Israeli blockades and offensives. That is why the lifting of the siege is
essential to reach a lasting pacification of the area. The cease-fire concluded on 26 August
provides only minimal confidence-building measures in that regard. And international monitoring
will be key to moving forward and consolidating the truce.
The European Union (EU) pledged its readiness to revive its Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM), a short-lived monitoring mission that was established in Rafah after the 2005 Israeli
withdrawal but soon collapsed because of Europe’s decision to boycott the newly elected Hamas
authorities in 2006. In addition to the crossing points, the EU could also provide naval escorts and
controls to sea traffic between Gaza and Limassol (Cyprus). Those are not mere technicalities, since
Washington would finally have to accept that the EU is not just a donor as generous as it is passive.
Conclusion
Historians well know that there is a limit to the suffering a designated power can inflict on a
population it deems “hostile.” This twelfth Israeli war on Gaza should be the last one if an even
more major catastrophe is to be avoided. Israel has tried everything in Gaza and failed repeatedly,
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with the territory’s Palestinian population paying with its own flesh and blood the price of Israeli
failures over and over again. There is not a family in Gaza that is not mourning a relative killed,
maimed, or detained—and in many cases, many more than one relative. Such tragedy is by no
means destined but rather the product of this twelve-war cycle inflicted on Gaza, which came full
circle with the elusive conclusion of Operation Protective Edge.
Gaza is not only an integral part of Palestine, it is the only one that survived the 1948 Nakba
without either being absorbed into Israel or annexed by Jordan. There was no place for an entity
like Gaza in the Zionist plan, which is a major reason for the extreme brutality that Israel has
visited on the territory’s population throughout the twelve wars. But Gaza is there to stay as a
collective embodiment of Palestinian nationalism: It is in Gaza that Palestinian independence was
proclaimed, in Gaza that the fedayeen first arose, in Gaza that the founders of Fatah gained their
know-how, in Gaza that the first intifada started, and in Gaza that Hamas was established. More
importantly perhaps, it is in Gaza that the Palestinian resistance movement was able to cause an
Israeli withdrawal after its first occupation of the territory in 1956–57.
The 2005 “unilateral withdrawal” was supposed to transform the occupation and render it less
costly for Israel both financially and in terms of security. But as the four wars since then have
shown, the “reformed” occupation has proved frustrating for the Israelis and devastating for the
Palestinians. With no more Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip, no religious sites that are disputed
between Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and the 1949 cease-fire lines long accepted as a permanent
border, agreeing on the parameters of peaceful coexistence should have proven easier in Gaza than
in the West Bank. Yet, the twelve-war cycle has demonstrated quite the contrary.
This might be because the core issue in Gaza holds the key to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Is
Israel able to deal with Palestinians who are neither occupied nor dependent? It is a simple
question, but one which has far-reaching implications. If the answer is resoundingly positive, Gaza,
as the cradle of Palestinian nationalism, could become the cornerstone of an authentic peace
between Israel and Palestine. Conversely, it is clear that there will never be hope for Palestine as a
whole as long as Gaza remains under attack.
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